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IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK DURING ECONOMIC DOWNTURNS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE USE OF
EVENT STUDIES IN SECURITIES LITIGATION
Edward G. Fox, Merritt B. Fox & Ronald J. Gilson
Abstract
We reported in a recent paper that during the 2008-09 financial crisis, for the average
firm, idiosyncratic risk, as measured by variance, increased by five-fold. This finding is
important for securities litigation because idiosyncratic risk plays a central role in event study
methodology. Event studies are commonly used in securities litigation to determine materiality
and loss causation.
Many bits of news affect an issuer’s share price at the time of a corporate disclosure that
is the subject of litigation. Because of this, even if an issuer’s market–adjusted price changes at
the time of the disclosure, one cannot determine with certainty whether the disclosure itself had
any effect on price. An event study is used to make a probabilistic assessment of whether in fact
it did. Use of event studies generates a certain rate of Type I errors (disclosures that had no
actual effect on price being identified as having had an effect) and a certain rate of Type II
errors (disclosures that had an actual effect not being identified as such).
This paper sets out a simple model of the tradeoff between these Type I and Type II
errors. The model is used to establish three fundamental points. First, an economic crisis can
radically worsen this tradeoff by making it much more difficult to catch a disclosure of a certain
size without introducing more Type I errors. Second, during crisis periods a relaxation of this
standard (and hence an increase in the acceptable rate of Type I errors) may actually decrease
Type II errors by less than it would in normal times. We prove that whether the decrease is
greater or smaller in crisis times depends on whether the disclosure’s actual impact on price is
more or less negative than a definable crossover point. Third, whether relaxation of the
standard in troubled times would increase or decrease social welfare is ambiguous. It depends
on distribution of potentially actionable disclosures in terms of their actual impact on price and
the social costs and social benefits of imposing liability for disclosures of each given level of
actual negative impact on price.
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In a recent paper, we reported findings that have important implications relating to the
use of event studies in securities litigation.1 During the 2008-09 financial crisis, there was a
dramatic increase, across all industries, in the volatility of individual firm share prices after
adjustment for movements in the market as a whole. As depicted in Figure 1 and reported in
Table A below, for the average firm, idiosyncratic risk, as measured by variance, increased by
five-fold from the one-year period July 1, 2006 through June 30, 2007 to the one-year period of
July 1, 2008 through June 30, 2009.2 Just as dramatically, idiosyncratic risk dropped back to
approximately normal levels by June 30, 2010.3

1

Edward G. Fox, Merritt B. Fox & Ronald J. Gilson, Economic Crisis and Share Price Unpredictability: Reasons
and Implications (August 12, 2013) (manuscript available for the authors) at 13.
2
Id.
3
Id.
2

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2314058

Figure 1

Table A

Period
July 1, 2005-June 30, 2006
July 1, 2006-June 30, 2007
July 1, 2007-June 30, 2008
July 1, 2008-June 30, 2009

Average Annual Company-Specific Volatility
(Var)
All
Financial
Non-Financial
3.5%
3.3%
5.7%
18.2%

1.8%
1.7%
8.9%
74.0%

3.8%
3.6%
5.4%
13.3%

This turns out to be a recurrent phenomenon. As depicted in Figure 2, looking from 1926
up through the present, we found that the pattern of increased idiosyncratic risk being associated
with poor macroeconomic performance regularly repeats itself, with particularly high levels of
idiosyncratic risk at the time of the stock market crash of 1929, the early years of the Great

3

Depression in the early 1930s, the economy’s retreat into deep recession in 1937 and the bust of
the dot-com boom in 2001.4

These results are important for securities litigation because the primary focus of event
studies is on idiosyncratic risk. Event studies have grown in the last few decades to play a
central role in many kinds of such actions. They are particularly important in class action fraudon-the-market suits against corporate issuers. These are actions based on the idea that a
misstatement by the issuer in violation of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 10b-5 inflated
the price of the issuer’s shares thereby damaging investors who purchase the shares at the
inflated price and who still hold them after the inflation dissipates. Event studies are the
predominate way that plaintiffs in such actions establish the causal link between the Rule 10b-5
violation and their losses, i.e., that the issuer misstatement in fact inflated the prices that they

4

These results are consistent with those found by Campbell et al. for the 35-year period from 1962 to 1997, where
they, as do we, find sharp increases in idiosyncratic risk associated with the 1970, 1974, 1980, 1982 and 1991
recessions as well as with the October 1987 market. John Y. Campbell, Martin Lettau, Burton G. Malkiel and
Yexiao Xu, Have Individual Stocks Become More Volatile?: An Empirical Exploration of Idiosyncratic Risk, 56 J.
FIN. 1 (2001) at 13 (Figure 4).
4

paid for their shares.5 They are also frequently the way that plaintiffs establish the materiality of
the misstatements at issue. Event studies have also frequently been used to determine materiality
in other kinds of securities actions. These include cases involving claims of insider trading in
violation of Rule 10b-5 and cases involving claims by purchasers in public offerings seeking
damages under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 for misstatements or omissions in the
registration statement. This growing use of event studies has proceeded without an appreciation
of the spike in idiosyncratic volatility that accompanies each patch of economic bad times.
An event study is an established tool in financial economics for measuring the effect of
an item of news on securities prices.6 At the time that an item of seemingly negative news
relating to a specific issuer becomes public, there are a myriad of other bits of news that also
affect the issuer’s share price. So the mere fact that the share price moved down simultaneous
with the tested item of news becoming public does not prove that the tested item had any
negative effect on price.7 It is possible that the tested item had no negative influence on price
and that the observed decline in price is simply the result of the net impact of all these other bits
of news. An event study helps sort out the different possible influences on price in order to
assess the likelihood that the tested item of news was one of the bits that did in fact influence
price negatively.
The starting point for conducting an event study is to determine the market-adjusted
change in the issuer’s share price at the time of the tested item becomes public. The marketadjusted change is the difference between the observed price change at this time and what the
simultaneous change in overall stock market prices predicts would have been the issuer’s price
change. This prediction is based on the historical relationship (usually over a one year
observation period) between price changes in the overall market and price changes of the issuer
under study. The point of making this market adjustment is to attempt to remove the influence of
bits of news affecting the share price all firms -- i.e., bits of systematic news -- from the observed
change in the issuer’s share price at the time of the tested disclosure. What is left – the marketadjusted price change – is the portion of the observed change in price that is due to bits of news
that relate only to the issuer under study -- i.e., bits of unsystematic news. Because the tested
item of information relates specifically to the issuer, if it in fact had any effect on price, it would
be among these remaining bits of unsystematic news.
The next step is to determine the likelihood that the tested item of news is one of the
remaining bits negatively affecting price after the effects of the systematic bits have been
5

A recent article sympathetic to plaintiffs explains the conclusion that an event study is mandatory for a securities
class action case to proceed. See Michael J. Kaufman & John Wunderlich, Regressing: The Troubling Dispositive
Role of Event Studies in Fraud Litigation, 15 STAN. J. LAW, BUS. & FIN. 183 (2009).
6

The basic steps in conducting an event study are set out IN JOHN Y. CAMPBELL, ANDREW W. LO & A. CRAIG
MACKINLEY, THE ECONOMETRICS OF FINANCIAL MARKETS (1998).
7
For simplicity of exposition, the discussion that follows will proceed under the assumption that the question that is
legally relevant is whether or not the public dissemination of the item of information being tested had a negative
effect on price. A symmetric version of the discussion would be equally valid, however, where the question is
whether or not the item had a positive effect on price.
5

eliminated. This determination is made by comparing the magnitude of the issuer’s marketadjusted change on the day that the tested item of news becomes public, with the historical
record of the ups and downs in the issuer’s daily market-adjusted returns, i.e., with the issuer’s
historical idiosyncratic volatility. Financial economists will often conclude that the marketadjusted price change is “statistically significant” only if its magnitude is sufficiently large that
there is a less than a 5% chance of observing a market-adjusted change of this magnitude as the
result of the other kinds of firm specific bits of news that have historically been creating
idiosyncratic volatility in the issuer’s share returns. If the observed change is greater than
approximately two standard deviations8 in the usual day-to-day market-adjusted movement in
returns on the issuer’s shares, researchers will conclude that there is less than a 5% chance that
bits of firm specific news of the kind that historically have been creating idiosyncratic volatility
were the sole cause of the price change under study. If the magnitude of the issuer’s observed
market-adjusted price change is sufficient to pass this test and there are no other identifiable,
self-evidently important bits of firm specific information simultaneously becoming available to
the market, the observer can, with at least 95% confidence, reject the null hypothesis that the
observed market-adjusted price change was due entirely to factors other than the tested item of
news. In other words, the observer can reject with this level of confidence the proposition that
the tested item had no effect on price.
The foregoing description of event study methodology encapsulates a critical
observation. Because there are many other bits of news affecting an issuer’s share price at the
time that a tested item of news becomes public, we cannot determine for certain whether the
tested item in fact impacted price. We instead use an event study to make a probabilistic
assessment of whether the item in fact had any effect on price. When applied repeatedly in
similar situations, this test will generate a certain rate of false positives (“Type I” errors).
Usually a securities litigation is based on the theory that the tested item of news move the price
in a particular direction and the evidentiary question is the likelihood that the item in fact moved
the price in this direction. For purposes of illustration, we will assume throughout this paper that
the theory is that the item moved the price in a negative direction. Type I errors are thus
instances where the magnitude of the observed market-adjusted price change at the time the
tested item becomes public is sufficiently negative to satisfy the cutoff for statistical significance,
but where the tested item of news, in fact, had no negative effect on price. This test will also
generate a certain level of false negatives (“Type II” errors). These are situations where the
magnitude of the observed market-adjusted price change at the time of the tested item is not
sufficiently negative to satisfy the cutoff, but the item in fact did have a negative effect on price.
The higher the required level of statistical confidence, the more negative will be the cutoff, and
consequently the higher the rate of false negatives and the lower the rate of false positive.

8

This rule is based on idiosyncratic returns following a normal distribution. In fact these returns are likely not
exactly normal. See, e.g., Jonah B. Gelbach, Eric Helland & Jonathan Klick Valid Inference in Single-Firm, SingleEvent Studies, [forthcoming in ALER]. However, nearly all event studies are performed using the normal
distribution and we preserve that assumption here. Since returns are fatter-tailed, the insights of the article seem
likely in fact to be strengthened by non-normality.
6

This paper sets out a simple model of this tradeoff between Type I and Type II errors in
the use of an event study to determine whether a corporate disclosure has negatively affected its
share price. This model is used to establish three fundamental points. First, an economic crisis
can radically worsen the inevitable tradeoff between Type I and Type II errors. If the standard of
statistical significance used in normal times is maintained at the same level, a test that in normal
times catches most disclosures having, for example, a 5% actual impact on price, would, in times
of economic trouble such as 2008-09, catch relatively few. Second, whether relaxing this
standard (and hence increasing Type I errors) decreases Type II errors more in troubled times
than in normal times depends on the disclosure’s actual impact on price. For disclosures with a
more negative impact on price than a certain crossover point, Type II errors will be reduced in
troubled times. But for disclosures with a less negative impact than this crossover point, the
opposite is the case. Third, whether relaxing the standard in troubled times would increase or
decrease social welfare is ambiguous and depends on (i) in terms of actual impact on price, the
distribution, relative to this crossover point, of disclosures that would generate liability if the
market-adjusted price change accompanying the disclosure was sufficiently negative to pass the
more relaxed standard, and (ii) the social costs and social benefits of imposing liability with
respect to disclosures of each given level of actual negative impact on price.
I. A SIMPLE MODEL RELATING TYPE I ERROR,
TYPE II ERROR AND IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK
A. Type II errors
An event study displays Type II error when the actual impact on price (“AI”) of the news
of the event under study (“AI”) is negative but the observed market-adjusted price change
(“OC”) at the time of the news is not sufficiently negative to allow a rejection, with the specified
level of statistical confidence, the null hypothesis that the news of the event had no effect on
price. Thus, let:
AI= actual impact of the tested disclosure. We assume there was an impact and that it
was negative (AI<0).
OI= the net actual impact of all the other bits of firm specific information influencing
share price the same day that are of an ordinary day-to-day nature. OI is distributed
normally with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of SD.
OC = the observed market-adjusted price change, where OC = AI + OI
Because OC = AI + OI, OC will be distributed normally with a mean of AI and a standard
deviation of SD:

ZI = the Z value associated with the acceptable maximum number of Type I errors, where
the Z function is a normally distributed random variable with a mean of 0 and a standard
deviation of 1
7

Thus, ZI would equal -1.96 if no more than 2.5% of Type I errors where the return was highly
negative were tolerated (i.e., a two-tailed test at the 95% level of statistical confidence, with
-1.96 being the relevant benchmark for examining negative price movements that are statistically
significant).
OCC = ZI x SD.
Thus, OCC is the least negative value of OC that would pass the test for statistical significance
based on the maximum permissible number of Type I errors.

ZC is the value of the Z function that corresponds to OCC after standardizing the distribution of
OC (which, as defined above, has a mean of AI and a standard deviation of SD). All values of Z
less positive or more negative than ZC (i.e., to the left of ZC under the bell-shaped curve)
correspond to values of OC that are more negative than OCC and hence represent observed price
changes sufficiently negative to correctly identify the event as having a negative impact on price.
All values of Z more positive or less negative than ZC (i.e., to the right of ZC under the bellshaped curve) correspond to values of OC that are less negative than OCC and hence represent
observed price changes insufficiently negative to correctly identify the event as having a
negative impact on price and thus represent Type II errors.
The likelihood of a Type II error = 1 - Φ(ZC), where Φ is the cumulative density function
(the “CDF”) of the normal distribution with mean of zero and a standard deviation of one
(the standard normal cumulative density function).9
Φ is a increasing function of Z and corresponds to the probability under the normal distribution’s
bell-shaped curve to the left of the Z value in question. Thus the more negative or less positive
9

This can be demonstrated as follows:

Pr(Correctly Identifying AI as distinct from ordinary day) = Pr(OC<OCC)
Pr(Type II) = 1- Pr(Correctly Identifying AI as distinct from ordinary day) = 1- Pr(OC<OCC)
Pr(Type II) = 1- Pr(AI+OI< ZI x SD)

(note AI+OI ~ Normal(AI, SD2)

Pr(Type II) = 1- Pr(OI< ZI x SD - AI)

(note OI ~Normal(0, SD2)

Pr(Type II) = 1- Pr(ε< ZI – AI/SD)

(where ε= OI/SD; ε~Normal(0,1)

Pr(Type II) = 1-Φ(ZC)
8

ZC, the smaller Φ(ZC) and the greater the likelihood of Type II error. This leads to three
important conclusions:
(i) The greater SD, for any given AI, the greater the likelihood of Type II error. This is
because ZC = ZI - AI/SD and AI is a negative number and SD is a positive number. So the
greater SD, the more negative or less positive will be ZC.
(ii) The smaller the actual negative impact of the event, i.e., the less negative AI, the
greater the likelihood of Type II error. This is because ZC = ZI - AI/SD and AI is a
negative number and SD is a positive number. So the less negative
AI, the more negative or less positive will be ZC.
(iii) The higher the level of statistical significance and hence the lower the acceptable
maximum Type I error rate, the greater the likelihood of Type II error. This is because
ZC = ZI - AI/SD and AI is a negative number and SD is a positive number. So the more
negative ZI, the more negative or less positive will be ZC.
B. Type I errors
In the context of the use of event studies in securities litigation, if an event on its face appears
negative, a reasonable simplifying assumption is that news of the event has an actual impact on
price that is either 0 or negative, not positive. If so, then an event study can generate Type I
error only when AI = 0 because there will be no possible positive values of AI that we will need
to consider. Type I error occurs then when AI = 0 but OC<OCC. By definition, the Type I error
rate will therefore correspond to the chosen standard of statistical confidence. Thus, for example
the Type I error rate would be 2.5% for a two tailed test at the 5% significance level with -1.96
being the relevant benchmark for examining negative price movements that are statistically
significant).10
10

The same setup can be used to analyze the effect of Type I errors without this simplifying assumption. Under
these more general conditions, Type I error occurs when the AI = 0 or is > 0, and OC< OCC.
A standard of statistical significance, with its corresponding Z I is defined in terms of the percentage of false
positives when AI = 0. Again the relevant formula is ZC = ZI - AI/SD. When AI = 0, ZC = ZI and Type I error equals
the amount of probability under the normal distribution’s bell-shaped curve to the left of the ZI.
The likelihood of a Type I error = Φ(ZC), where Φ is the cumulative density function of the normal distribution with
a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one (the standard normal CDF).
Again, Φ is a positive function of Z and corresponds to the amount of probability under the normal distribution’s
bell-shaped curve to the left of the Z value in question. Thus the more negative ZC, the smaller F(ZC) and the
smaller the likelihood of Type I error.
If AI>0, because ZC = ZI - AI/SD and AI is a positive number, for any given AI, the greater SD, the less negative
will be ZC and hence the greater the likelihood of Type I error.
9

II. THE EFFECT OF AN ECONOMIC-CRISIS INDUCED SPIKE IN IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK ON THE
TYPE I/TYPE II ERROR TRADEOFF
This section considers what happens to the Type II error rate with respect to an
event with an actual negative impact of -5%, which is often considered by securities lawyers as a
rough-rule-of-thumb starting point making a materiality determination. We assume that a
“strict” 95% required level of statistical confidence (i.e., a maximum Type I error rate of 2.5%)
is retained when an economic crisis boosts idiosyncratic risk sharply above its normal level.
Based on the empirical record for the period from the 1970s up until the financial crisis,
we set the daily standard deviation in the typical firm’s market-adjusted price in this “normal”
period equal to 1.78%.11 Similarly, we set the daily standard deviation in the typical firm’s
market-adjusted price during the “volatile” period at the height of the financial crisis, July 1,
2008 through June 30, 2009 equal to 3.23%.12 So,
ZI = -1.96% (so in a two-tailed test, the maximum number of (negative) Type I errors is
2.5%).
SDN = standard deviation during normal times = 1.78%
SDV = standard deviation during volatile times = 3.23%

Similarly, because ZC = ZI - AI/SD, the more positive AI, i.e., the more positive the impact of the corrective
disclosure on price, the more negative will be ZC and hence the smaller the likelihood of Type I error.
Finally, because ZC = ZI - AI/SD, the less negative ZI, i.e., the lower the level of statistical significance and hence
the higher the acceptable maximum percentage of false positives when AI = 0, the less negative will be Z C for any
positive AI. Thus, for a corrective disclosure with a given positive AI, the less negative the observed marketadjusted price change needs to be for it to be considered statistically significant and thus the greater the likelihood of
Type I error.
11

See Fox, Fox & Gilson, supra note 1, at 35. The market-cap-weighted average firm specific volatility, as
measured by variance, from the 1970s up until the financial crisis was in the range of 6-10% during normal years,
with an average of approximately 8%. This annualized variance translates to a daily “standard error” of 1.78%. Our
calculations in our earlier paper of these annual figures are based on daily data and so it is these annual variances
252

that are interpolated using the following mathematical formula:

Var (  i )  252*Var ( i ) where
i 1

252


i 1

i

is the

sum of the market-adjusted returns on each of the 252 trading days each year, and thus the left hand side is the
annual variance of market-adjusted returns. The equality flows because the market-adjusted returns will be
independent of one another in an efficient market. A reader can back out the daily variance by dividing the
annualized numbers by 252. The daily standard error is the square root of the daily variance. Due to the nonlinearity of variance, this is not the exact figure that we yield after market cap weighting the standard errors of the
individual firms but this difference is relatively minor.
12
Id. at 44.
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From this, we can calculate the respective cutoff values for normal and volatile times if, as
assumed, the strict test allowing only 2.5% Type I errors is maintained:
OCCN = ZI x SDN (the cutoff in normal times) = -1.96 x 1.78 = -3.5%
OCCV = ZI x SDV (the cutoff in volatile times) = -1.96 x 3.23 = -6.33%
In turn, each of these two cutoff values has respectively associated with it a normalized (0 mean,
standard deviation of 1) Z value:

ZCN = ZI - AI/SDN =
ZCV = ZI - AI/SDV =
The likelihood of a Type II error in normal times = 1 - Φ(ZCN) = 1 – Φ(.85) = 1 - .802 = .198
The likelihood of a Type II error in normal times = 1 - Φ(ZCN) = 1 – Φ(-.41) = 1 - .340 = .660
Thus, if the Type I error rate is maintained at 2.5%, the Type II error rate jumps in crisis times
from 19.8% to 66%. In other words, in high volatility times resembling the 2008-09 financial
crisis, only a bit more than one in three disclosures that actually affected an issuer’s price by 5%
would pass the test of being considered statistically significant at the 95% level, compared with
better than four out of five passing the test in normal times.

III. THE EFFECT OF INCREASE IN IDIOSYNCRATIC VOLATILITY ON HOW MUCH TYPE II
ERRORS ARE REDUCED BY INCREASING THE
MAXIMUM ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF TYPE I ERRORS
This part of the paper considers what happens in terms of Type II errors from a shift from
a “strict” test (i.e. from a lower maximum number of allowable Type I errors and thus a higher
required standard of statistical confidence level) to a “lax” test (i.e., to a higher maximum
allowable Type I errors and thus a lower required standard of statistical confidence) in highly
volatile times compared to what happens from such a shift in normal times. We conclude that in
volatile times the shift can lead to either a larger or smaller decrease in Type II errors than in
normal times, depending on how negative the impact of the tested disclosure is, i.e., how
negative AI is.
Consider the following additional definitions:
ZIS = the Z value associated with the acceptable maximum number of Type I errors
concerning the existence of a negative AI under the strict regime. For example, ZIS
would equal -1.96 if the maximum number of (negative) Type I errors is 2.5%.
11

ZIL = the Z value associated with the acceptable maximum number of Type I errors
concerning the existence of a negative AI under the lax regime. For example, ZIL would
equal -1.64 if no more than 5% of (negative) Type I errors were tolerated.
SDN = standard deviation during normal times
SDV = standard deviation during volatile times
This suggests four different cutoff values in terms of what the least negative OC, i.e., the
observed market-adjusted price change that would pass the test in terms of the maximum
allowable number of Type I errors:
OCCLN = ZIL x SDN (the cutoff for the lax test in normal times)
OCCSN = ZIS x SDN (the cutoff for the strict test in normal times)
OCCLV = ZIL x SDV (the cutoff for the lax test in volatile times)
OCCSV = ZIS x SDV (the cutoff for the strict test in volatile times)
Note OCCLN will be the largest (least negative) and OCCSV will be the smallest (most negative).
In turn, each of these four cutoff values has respectively associated with it a normalized (0 mean,
standard deviation of 1) Z value:
ZCLN = ZIL - AI/SDN
ZCSN = ZIS - AI/SDN
ZCLV = ZIL - AI/SDV
ZCSV = ZIS - AI/SDV
The reduction in the likelihood of Type II error in moving from the strict test to the lax test in
normal times equals:
Reduction N = [1 - Φ( ZCSN)] - [1- Φ(ZCLN)] = Φ(ZCLN) - Φ( ZCSN)
The reduction in the likelihood of Type II error in moving from the strict test to the lax test in
volatile times equals:
Reduction V = [1 - Φ( ZCSV)] - [1- Φ(ZCLV)] = Φ(ZCLV) - Φ( ZCSV)
The difference between the reduction in Type II error by moving to the lax standard in volatile
times versus normal times is thus:
12

ΔReduction = Reduction V - Reduction N = [Φ(ZCLV) - Φ( ZCSV)] - [Φ(ZCLN) - Φ( ZCSN)]
The object of our inquiry is whether ΔReduction is positive (i.e., moving to a lax standard results
in a bigger reduction in Type II error in volatile times) or negative (i.e., moving to a lax standard
results in a smaller reduction in Type II error in volatile times)
The critical thing to note is that:
ZCLV - ZCSV = ZCLN - ZCSN = ZIL - ZIS
(i.e., the difference in the Z values associated with the lax test versus the strict test) because
ZCLV - ZCSV = [ZIL - AI/SDV] - [ZIS - AI/SDV] = ZIL - ZIS
ZCLN - ZCSN = [ZIL - AI/SDN] - [ZIS - AI/SDN] = ZIL - ZIS
Thus Reduction N and Reduction V each involve the same change in the argument of the Φ
function. The difference in the Φ value thus depends only on where along the function this
change occurs. In other words, in each of normal and volatile times, the reduction in Type II
error is represented by the difference in the value of the cumulative density function (the “CDF”)
of the standard normal distribution between such time’s ZC for strict and lax tests.
A. A comparison of the effect with a slightly negative AI versus a highly negative AI.
As demonstrated more formally below, consider first where the tested disclosure has a relatively
small actual negative impact on price, i.e., where AI is negative by a relatively small amount,
such that it is less negative than all the cutoffs, OCCLN, OCCLV, OCCSN, and OCCSV (i.e.
AI>OCCLN) . Recall that for any given AI, OC is a normally distributed random variable with a
mean of AI. These cutoffs would thus all be values of OC that are below this mean. Hence the
cutoffs all correspond to Z values that are to the left of 0 and are all negative. Since ZCSV is to
the left of ZCSN, the difference in the CDF evaluated at ZCSV to ZCLV will be less than the area
under the curve running from ZCSN to ZCLN. Thus for AIs of this size, a switch to a lax regime,
with its given increase in Type I error will in volatile times yield a smaller reduction in Type II
error than the same switch in normal times. This is illustrated in Diagram 1 below.
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The mirror opposite analysis applies where the tested disclosure has a relatively large
negative impact on price, i.e., where AI is sufficiently negative that it is more negative than all
the cutoffs, OCCLN, OCCLV, OCCSN and OCCSV (i.e. AI<OCCSV). These cutoffs would thus all be
values of OC that are above this mean. Hence the cutoffs all correspond to Z values that are to
the right of 0 and are all positive. Since ZCSV is to the left of ZCSN, the difference in the CDF
between ZCSV and ZCLV will be more than the difference between ZCSN and ZCLN. Thus for AIs of
this size, a switch to a lax regime, with its given increase in Type I error will, in volatile times,
yield a greater reduction in Type II error than the same switch in normal times. This is illustrated
in Diagram 2 below.
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More formally, when AI is sufficiently small in magnitude that OCCLN < AI (recall both are
negative), then:
ZCLN < 0 since AI > OCCLN → AI > ZIL

SDN → AI/SDN > ZIL → ZCLN < 0

Because ZCSN = ZIS - AI/SDN, ZCLN = ZIL - AI/SDN, and ZIS < ZIL,
ZCSN < ZCLN
Because ZCSV = ZIS - AI/SDV, ZCSN = ZIS - AI/SDN, AI < 0, and SDV > SDN,
ZCSV < ZCSN
So ZCSV < ZCSN < ZCLN < 0. For values of Z < 0, the CDF of the standard normal distribution is
convex (i.e., the second derivative of Φ, dΦ’/dZ > 0) and so the increase in cumulative
probability (i.e., the decrease in the probability of a false negative) is less going from ZCSV to
ZCLV (the more negative interval) than from ZCSN to ZCLN (the less negative interval of the same
length). Thus ΔReduction is negative.
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When AI is sufficiently negative that AI < OCCSV, then 0 < ZCSV and the mirror opposite
analysis occurs. 0 < ZC SV < ZCSN < ZCLN. For values of Z > 0, the CDF of the standard normal
distribution is concave (i.e., the second derivative of Φ, dΦ’/dZ < 0 and so the increase in
cumulative probability (i.e., the decrease in the probability of a false negative) is more going
from ZCSV to ZCLV (the less positive interval) than from ZCSN to ZCLN (the more positive interval
of the same length). Thus ΔReduction is positive.
B. An example: For an AI = -5%, a comparison of the decrease in Type II errors from
moving from the 95% to 90% standard of statistical confidence (and hence from 2.5% to
5% acceptable (negative) Type I error rate) in normal times (the average volatility for
the typical firm for the period from the 1970s until the financial crisis) and doing so in
volatile times (the volatility during the peak of the financial crisis)
Assume an AI of -5%.
As above, based on the empirical record we set “normal” period volatility equal to
1.78%. Similarly, we set the daily standard deviation in the typical firm’s market-adjusted price
during the “volatile” period at the height of the financial crisis, July 1, 2008 through June 30,
2009, equal to 3.23%.
1. The lowering of the standard in normal times
SDN = 1.78%, ZIS = -1.96 and ZIL = -1.64. Therefore,

ZCSN = ZIS - AI/SDN =
ZCLN = ZIL - AI/SDN =
Φ(.85) = .802. Φ(1.17) = .879. The reduction in Type II error is .077, from about 20%
to about 12%, or about 8%
2. The lowering of the standard in volatile times
SDV = 3.23%, ZIS = -1.96 and ZIL = -1.64. Therefore,
ZCSV = ZIS - AI/SDV =
ZCLV = ZIL - AI/SDV =
Φ(-.41.) = .341 Φ(-.09) = .464. The reduction in Type II error is .123, from about 66%
to about 54%, or about 12%
16

Thus, a disclosure with an actual price impact of -5% has a sufficiently negative impact that the
switch to the lax standard reduces Type II errors more in volatile times than in normal ones.
C. The minimum negative AI (the “Type II Error Crossover Point”) for a move from strict to
lax (95% to 90% standard of statistical confidence and hence from 2.5% to 5% Type I
error) that will yield a bigger decline in Type II error in volatile times (peak of financial
crisis) than in ordinary times (post 70s normal).
Set ΔReduction = 0
0 = [Φ(ZCLV) - Φ( ZCSV)] - [Φ(ZCLN) - Φ( ZCSN)]
= [Φ (ZIL – AI*/SDV) - Φ(ZIS – AI*/SDV)] - [Φ(ZIL – AI*/SDN) - Φ(ZIS – AI*/SDN)]
Solving this formula for AI* gives the value of the Type II Error Crossover point. For AI values
more negative than AI*, moving to a laxer test in a period of heightened volatility reduces Type
II error more than the same move in normal volatility times. For AI* values below the crossover
point, the opposite is the case.
Filling in the known variables, in the case of a move from the 95% standard to the 90% standard
when idiosyncratic risk increases from the normal level to the peak of the financial crisis level
and rearranging
[Φ(-1.64 – AI*/3.23) - Φ(-1.96 – AI*/3.23)] = [Φ(-1.64 – AI*/1.78) - Φ(-1.96 – AI*/1.78)]
A formal solution to this problem looks difficult, but the problem can be first approached
conceptually by thinking through how things would look under the bell-shaped curve, as
illustrated in Diagram 3 below. At the crossover point, the decrease in Type II errors is the same
in normal and volatile times. The intervals under the bell-shaped curve corresponding to the drop
in standard respectively in volatile and normal times are the same length. They must be located
symmetrically around the mean of 0. This is because the difference in the CDF (or equivalently
in the area under the probability density function (PDF) of the two intervals) will be the same
only if the intervals are the mirror opposites of the other (e.g., one interval runs from -.6 to -.3
and the other runs from .3 to .6 or one interval runs from -.2 to +.1 and the other runs from -.1 to
+.2). When the areas are the same, the reduction in Type II errors is the same.
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Diagram 3

This point can be formalized and a formula derived for AI*, the Type II Error Crossover Point,
given the strictness of the stricter test, the laxness of the laxer test and the standard deviations for
normal and volatile times.
For ΔReduction = 0, ZCLN = -ZCSV because that is where the bands are located symmetrically
around 0 below the curve. Thus:
ZIL – AI*/SDN = -(ZIS – AI*/SDV)
= -ZIS + AI*/SDV
ZIL+ZIS = AI* x
ZIL+ZIS = AI* x (

)
)
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AI* = (ZIL+ZIS) x (

)

Applying this formula to moving from 2.5% allowable Type I error to 5% allowable Type I error
-4.13 = (-1.96 - 1.64) x
Thus, the crossover point, AI*, equals -4.13%. At that point, the reduction in Type II will be the
same in normal and in volatile times.
When the AI is more negative than -4.13%, then moving from 5% to 10% allowable Type I
errors will produce a larger reduction in Type II errors in periods with the volatility of the recent
financial crisis than in periods with normal volatility. When the AI is less negative than -4.13%,
then moving from 2.5% to 5% allowable Type I errors will actually yield a smaller reduction in
such volatile periods than in normal periods.
D. The “Type II Error Crossover Point” for a move at the margin to a laxer regime from the
95% standard of statistical confidence.
A similar calculation can be made to the value of AI* for a reduction at the margin in the
standard from the 5% significance level. Here, the value of ZIL would at the limit approach the
value ZIS, which is -1.96. Applying the formula, the AI* in this situation is -4.50%.
-4.50 = (-1.96 - 1.96) x
IV. THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF LOWERING THE STANDARD OF STATISTICAL
CONFIDENCE IN CRISIS-INDUCED HIGH IDIOSYNCRATIC VOLATILITY TIMES
As noted earlier, the finding that an issuer disclosure has a statistically significant
negative impact on price, combined with other necessary elements, can trigger liability with
respect to a number of actions. This is the case, for example, for a disclosure correcting an
earlier misstatement made with scienter that is the subject of a Rule 10b-5 fraud-on-the-market
action. It is also true in a Rule 10b-5 insider trading case with regard to the disclosure of the
previously non-public information on which an insider traded. The actual price impact of the
disclosure is a proxy, respectively, for how much the earlier misstatement distorted price or how
important the previously non-public information traded on was. The chosen level of statistical
confidence thus affects the likelihood that liability will be imposed for the misstatement or inside
trade to which the disclosure relates.
There will, for normal times, be some socially optimal standard of statistical significance,
the satisfaction of which triggers liability. This standard is determined by whatever is the
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optimal tradeoff of Type I for Type II errors in normal times. In the discussion that follows,
assume that in normal times, the socially optimal tradeoff of Type I for Type II errors occurs at
the 95% standard of statistical confidence. This choice is purely conventional and the results
hold for whatever level is in fact optimal in normal times. The question being addressed is
whether, if the standard being used in normal times is in fact optimal, does the radical worsening
of the tradeoff in economic-crisis-driven high idiosyncratic risk times call for a lowering of the
standard. The answer, developed below, is that the situation is ambiguous and depends on
distribution of potentially actionable disclosures in terms of their actual impact on price and the
social costs and social benefits of imposing liability for disclosures of each given level of actual
negative impact on price.
Understanding the tradeoff in social welfare terms in turn requires an understanding of
both the social benefits and social costs of imposing liability for disclosure that affect’s an
issuer’s share price by any given amount. Forcing a defendant to pay out damages deters
undesirable behavior in the future, such as an issuer making a misstatement or an insider trading
on non-public information. This gain does not come for free, however, because securities
litigation uses scarce resources that could otherwise be deployed to other productive purposes.
These resources include the lawyers’ and experts’ time on both sides of any such litigation, as
well as the time and effort associated with such litigation expended by the issuer’s executives
and the judiciary. The amount of resources consumed by such a litigation is similar whether the
disclosure had a large impact on price, a small one or none. Thus, ideally liability should be
imposed only in cases where, at the margin, the improvement in economic welfare from the
behavior that is deterred is at least as great as the costs of bringing the action. This suggests that
there is some degree of actual price effect from the tested disclosure where it would be better not
to impose liability. We will call this point the “Materiality Threshold.” This is because the
relatively small effect of the disclosure on price suggests that the behavior giving rise to the suit
is not seriously damaging to society. For example it would suggest that the earlier misstatement
that the disclosure corrects did not distort prices by very much or that the non-public information
that the insider traded on was not very important. To impose liability in such situations would
attract socially wasteful litigation.
With this understanding of the social benefits and social costs associated with imposing
liability in response to disclosures in terms of their actual effect on price, we can now explore
the meaning of the assumption that the 95% standard constitutes the socially optimal point of
tradeoff between Type I and Type II errors relating to probabilistic assessments of this actual
effect.
Type I error – with its resulting imposition of liability where the actual price impact of
the tested disclosure is 0 – unambiguously reduces social welfare. This is because the litigation is
costly and there is no gain in deterring behavior so unimportant that the disclosure has no impact
on price.
Type II error is slightly more complicated. Consider first a disclosure whose actual
impact on price is greater than the Materiality Threshold. Type II error with respect to whether a
disclosure had any actual negative effect on price also reduces social welfare. This is because
20

the error results in liability not being imposed in a situation where, by definition, the
improvement in economic welfare from the behavior that is deterred by the imposition of
liability is greater than the social costs of the legal action necessary to impose it. But for a
disclosure whose actual impact on price is less than the Materiality Threshold, the opposite is the
case. Type II error, by blocking imposition of liability in a situation where the social costs
exceed the social benefits, actually increases social welfare.
The question being addressed here is important because a possible policy reaction to the
worsening terms of the tradeoff between Type I and Type II errors brought about by economiccrisis-induced increased idiosyncratic volatility is to reduce the required standard of statistical
confidence from what is optimal in normal times (assumed for purposes of example to be 95%).
The idea would run that maintaining this standard during times of crisis leads to too large an
increase in Type II errors. It is better instead to lower the standard and accept some increase in
Type I errors in order to moderate the increase in Type II errors. To see if this idea represents
sound policy, we need to know whether there is any good reason to believe that lowering the
standard is in fact likely to increase social welfare.
A. The General Approach
The assumption that the 95% level is socially optimal in normal times means that, at the
margin, the social cost from an infinitesimal increase in Type I error just equals the social gain
from the resulting reduction in Type II error. And it means that the increase in social costs from a
greater than infinitesimal increase in Type I error must be greater than the increase in social
benefits from the resulting decrease in Type II error. So in normal times there could be no
improvement from lowering the standard.
For a lowering of the standard from 95% to be welfare enhancing in high idiosyncratic
volatility times, the social cost from an infinitesimal increase in Type I error must be less than
the social gain from the resulting reduction in Type II error. A given lowering in the confidence
standard will, by the very definition of what the level of statistical significance means, increase
Type I error by the same amount in high volatility times as in normal times. So the lowering of
the standard’s impact on Type I errors will have the same negative effect on social welfare in
crisis times as in normal times. Thus, the critical question is whether, at the margin, the
lowering of the standard will result in greater social welfare gains from reduced Type II errors
in crisis times than in normal times. If so, in crisis times, the increased social benefits from the
lowering’s impact on Type II errors will, at the margin, be greater than the increased social costs
from lowering’s impact on Type I errors, and hence there will be net gains from lowering the
standard to the point where the increased net benefits, at the margin, are again no more than the
increased costs.
In the context of this discussion, Type II error must, by definition, relate to tested
disclosures with a specified level of actual negative impact on price. For any given level of
actual negative price impact and given level of volatility, lowering of the required standard of
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statistical confidence will decrease the likelihood of Type II error.13 Thus, in both normal and
crisis times, lowering the required level of statistical confidence will reduce the rates of Type II
error associated with each level of actual negative price impact over the whole possible range
actual negative price impacts. As we saw earlier, however, for tested disclosures with actual
price effects more negative than what we called the Type II Error Crossover Point, a given
lowering of the standard will decrease Type II error more in high idiosyncratic volatility times
than in normal times.14 And for tested disclosures with actual price effects less negative than this
percentage, the opposite is the case. To illustrate, given the standard errors associated with,
respectively, normal and crisis times that we have used in our examples above, we saw that the
Type II crossover point equals -4.50% for the lowering, at the margin, the standard of statistical
confidence from 95%.15
As will be developed just below, the relative positions of this Type II Error Crossover
Point and the Materiality Threshold are critical factors in the analysis of whether, at the margin,
the impact on Type II errors from lowering the standard of statistical confidence would have a
greater net positive social welfare effect in a period of high idiosyncratic risk than in ordinary
times. These points are illustrated in Figure 2.
B. The Special Case Where the Type II Error Crossover Point Just Equals the Materiality
Threshold.
Consider first the special case where the Type II Error Crossover Point just equals the
Materiality Threshold. In this special case, the impact on Type II errors from lowering the
standard of statistical confidence would unambiguously have a greater net positive effect on
social welfare when done in a period of high idiosyncratic risk than when done in normal times.
To see why, recall that, by the definition of the Materiality Threshold, it is socially
desirable to impose liability where a tested disclosure has an actual price impact more negative
than this threshold because the social benefits from the deterrent effects of imposing liability
exceed the social costs of the litigation. And, for the opposite reasons, it is socially undesirable
to do so for tested disclosures with actual price impacts less negative than the Materiality
Threshold.
Where the Type II Error Crossover Point just equals the Materiality Threshold, for all
tested disclosures with actual price impacts more negative than this point, lowering the standard
will decrease false negatives by more when done in high idiosyncratic volatility times than when
done in normal times. This is the range of price impacts where reducing false negatives is
welfare enhancing because it is desirable for liability to be imposed where the tested disclosure’s
price impact is more negative than the Materiality Threshold.

13

See Part I.A supra.
See Part III.C supra.
15
See Part III.D supra.
14
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For all tested disclosures with actual price impacts less negative than this point, lowering
the standard will decrease false negatives by less when done in high idiosyncratic volatility times
than in normal times. Reducing false negatives for tested disclosures with price impacts in this
range is welfare destroying because it is undesirable for liability to be imposed where the price
impact is less negative than the Materiality Threshold.
Putting this together, over the full range of possible actual negative price effects from
tested disclosures, the impact on Type II errors from lowering the standard of statistical
confidence would have a greater net positive effect on social welfare when done in a period of
high idiosyncratic risk than when done in normal times. Therefore, in this special situation,
lowering the standard in volatile times would unambiguously increase social welfare.
C. The Ordinary Case Where the Type II Error Crossover Point does not equal the
Materiality Threshold.
It would be a pure coincidence for the Crossover Point just to equal the Materiality Threshold
since the factors determining each are independent of those determining the other. Thus the more
ordinary case would be that they are not equal. In this more ordinary case, the comparative
welfare effects of lowering the standard in crisis versus doing so in normal times becomes more
complicated. If the Crossover Point is either more or less negative than the Materiality
Threshold, there will be a range of market-adjusted actual negative price effects from tested
disclosures for which the standard lowering’s impact on Type II will have a less positive, or a
more negative, effect social welfare in a period of high idiosyncratic risk than in normal times.
For tested disclosures with actual negative price effects either more or less negative than those in
this range, the opposite is the case.
First consider the situation where the Crossover Point is more negative than the
Materiality Threshold. In this situation, for tested disclosures with actual price impacts less
negative than the Crossover Point but more negative than the Materiality Threshold, lowering the
standard in volatile times will reduce false negatives by less than doing so in normal times. This
is a range of actual price impacts where false negatives are undesirable. So, for tested
disclosures with price effects in this range, lowering the standard in crisis times is, in terms of its
impact on Type II errors, less socially beneficial than doing so in normal times.
Next consider the opposite situation, where the Crossover Point is less negative than the
Materiality Threshold. In this situation, for tested disclosures with actual price impacts more
negative than the Crossover Point but less negative than the Materiality Threshold, lowering the
standard in volatile times will reduce false negatives by more than doing so in normal times.
This is a range of actual price impacts, however, where false negatives are desirable. So, for
tested disclosures with price effects in this range, lowering the standard is, in terms of its impact
on Type II errors, more socially harmful than doing so in ordinary times.
Thus, in each of these two situations, for tested disclosures with actual negative price
effects over the particular range discussed, the welfare effects of lowering the standard in volatile
times would be less beneficial, or more harmful, than in normal times. For tested disclosures
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that have actual price effects that are either more or less negative than this range, the welfare
effects would be comparatively more favorable in crisis times than in normal times. This is so
for the same reasons as just discussed with respect to the special situation where the Type II
Error Crossover Point equals the Materiality Threshold.
In this ordinary case where the Crossover Point does not equal the Materiality Threshold,
figuring out whether the Type II error welfare effects for the two ranges where lowering the
standard in crisis times has a relatively more positive effect dominates the Type II error welfare
effects from the range where lowering the standard in crisis times has a relatively more negative
effect requires knowing the distribution of disapproved behaviors in the economy in terms of the
extent of negative effect on price associated with their corresponding tested disclosures. And it
requires knowing, for tested disclosures with each such level of price impact, the social gain or
loss arising from a comparison of imposing liability’s deterrence effect on the disapproved
behaviors versus the cost of the litigation.
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Figure 2
Social Welfare Effects Due to the Impact on Type II Error from Lowering the
Standard of Statistical Significance in Crisis Versus Normal Times
(+) = Social welfare effect from Type II error impact of lowering the standard in crisis times is more positive, or less
negative, than in normal times
(-) = Social welfare effect from Type II error impact of lowering the standard in crisis times is less positive, or more
negative, than in normal times
Type II Error Crossover Point is the level of a tested disclosure’s actual negative price impact less negative than
which lowering the standard of statistical significance in a crisis-induced period of high idiosyncratic volatility
results in a smaller reduction in Type II error than doing so in normal times and more negative than which the
opposite is the case.
The Materiality Threshold is the level of a tested disclosure’s actual negative price impact less negative than which
imposing liability for the corresponding disapproved behavior involves greater social costs than benefits and, above
which, the opposite is the case.
The comparative welfare effects of lowering the standard in normal versus volatile time is depicted here with regard
to three situations: the Type II Error Crossover Point = the Materiality Threshold, < the Materiality
Threshold, and > the Materiality Threshold.
Type II Error Crossover Point =Materiality Threshold
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(+)

0
Type II Error Crossover Point

Materiality Threshold

Type II Error Crossover Point more negative than the Materiality Threshold
(+)

(-)
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0
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Type II Error Crossover Point less negative than the Materiality Threshold
(+)

(-)

(+)

0
Materiality Threshold
Type II Error Crossover Point
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D. Summary
The question we have been addressing is whether the steep increase Type II errors during
economic-crisis-induced periods of high idiosyncratic volatility calls for lowering the standard of
statistical confidence used in event studies of tested disclosures in order to determine whether to
impose liability in certain kinds of securities actions. The issue boils down to whether, at the
margin, a lowering of the standard would have a more favorable welfare effect in terms of its
impact on Type II errors in volatile times compared to doing so in normal times. This distillation
follows logically from two observations. First, the negative welfare effects from the lowering’s
impact on Type I errors will be the same in volatile times as in normal times because by
definition it will reduce Type I errors by the same amount in each of these two periods. Second,
if the standard used in normal times is socially optimal, this negative welfare effect from the
lowering’s impact on Type I error will in normal times just equal the positive welfare effect from
its impact on Type II error. Thus, it is desirable to lower the standard in volatile times only if the
positive welfare effect from the lowering’s impact on Type II errors is greater in volatile times
than in normal times.
We have seen that as a general matter, without considerably more information, we cannot
determine whether in fact the net positive welfare effect from the lowering’s impact on Type II
errors is greater in volatile times than in normal times. Quite possibly the opposite would be so.
The exception is the special case where the Type II Error Crossover Point just equals the
Materiality Threshold, but it would be a pure coincidence for these two points to be equally
negative because each is determined by factors entirely independent of the factors determining
the other.
V. CONCLUSION
Event studies are commonly used in securities litigation to determine such issues as
materiality and loss causation. As used in such a litigation, an event study makes a probabilistic
assessment of whether a corporate disclosure had an effect on price or not. Use of such a test
inevitably involves both Type I errors (false positives) and Type II errors (false negatives). There
is an inevitable tradeoff between the two types of errors that is determined by the chosen
standard of statistical confidence.
In a recent paper, we reported that there was a sharp increase in idiosyncratic risk for the
average firm during the recent financial crisis and that this turned out to be a regular
phenomenon associated with economic downturns going back to the early 1920s. Such sharp
increases affect the tradeoff between Type I and Type II errors in event study tests and have
implications for their use in securities litigation.
This paper sets out a simple model of the tradeoff between these Type I and Type II
errors. The model is used to establish three fundamental points. First, an economic crisis can
radically worsen this tradeoff. If the normal-times standard of the maximum acceptable number
of Type I errors is maintained in crisis times, Type II errors will soar. A test that normally
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catches most disclosures that have, for example, a 5% actual negative impact on price will, in
troubled times, catch relatively few. Second, crisis times may have the effect that a relaxation of
this standard (and hence an increase in the rate of Type I errors) actually decreases Type II errors
by less, not by more, than it would in normal times. Whether the decrease is greater or smaller
in crisis times depends whether the disclosure’s actual impact on price is more or less negative
than a definable crossover point. Third, whether relaxation of the standard in troubled times
would increase or decrease social welfare is ambiguous. It depends on distribution of potentially
actionable disclosures in terms of their actual impact on price and the social costs and social
benefits of imposing liability for disclosures of each given level of actual negative impact on
price.
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